There is a war going on, one that you may not be aware of. In fact there are probably many non -conspiracy theory entanglements of a true nature going on in our World, such that we would lose sleep at night, if we knew who was in bed with who. Truth be told, this is life, its my life, your life, all lives - on every micro and/or macro level, we just aren't used to thinking globally. Then 2014 came with Twitterbook and Instaoogle, and suddenly, if I sing happy birthday to cousin Johnny on Youtube, I may get invited to perform on a reality show like StarFactorIdol. The point is, the World is a mess of those conspiracy theories and tabloid elements, but underneath of it all, there really is a neat World dynamic going on, one that God runs, and thus we should all pay attention to it. It is called the Laws of Noah.
Yes the Noahide Laws, surely you know all Three of them, no? You read that correctly, there are three Noahide Laws, contrary to what you have been told of the known Seven [Laws of Noah]. Now before you say why the miyut? [exclusion] realize this isn't a miyut - it's a ribui! [INCLUSION]
Yes the World will forever pursue and keep the Seven Laws of Noah, but in the Talmud there is a lesser known tradition of a subset, even secondary system of Three Laws of Noah. The Seven although they are National/Global [as well as the obvious individual path to Truth] are mostly an individual way, whereas the Three Laws mentioned in Chullin 92a are a more precise and even rational way that the World operates under. Ideally yes, the World will keep Seven Laws - maybe even become Ger Tzedek with the coming of the Messiah; however in a state of lesser revelation of the Divine, the World strives in Three:
- No Gay Marriage for Men
- No Cannibalism
- Respect Torah
Before people cringe and say, "well that sure wasn't hard" - take into context what this means on a National level; aside from the obvious that there is at least a million ways of viewing and flipping these three into countless extensions of meanings - most of which would be perfectly valid and profoundly true [even serving as the root of all common law today], the task is to perform them Nationally.
Generally at least 1/3 will serve as a crisis of PR for a country's elected. Gays? no. Ultra Liberal/Radical? no. Love those Jews?[and Gerim] no. These Three Laws pose as the ultimate thorn against popularity, and History [enter conspiracy theory here] supports this [as we were told].
It is brought down, that from the clear lens of America's great past in that they clearly kept and mastered the big three in their era of rule, World War Two was the turning point. I believe it was Churchill who predicted that Germany would lose the war, for they hadn't kept the Three, and America was the next Super Power ready to keep the Three. And just in case you've been sleeping in a cave for the last 50 years, that is the way it went down.
Then America did what every empire does, they dropped the Three Laws for re-election popularity. The conspiracy theorist in me says that every great empire runs this ride: rises through Three, Keeps the Three, loses the Three, loses its grip of dominion.
When we look at Russia today, and in face of America's withdrawal from this unique pedestal of holiness, can we say that Russia will rule [and play Messianic role/rule if the Times are real] and go Biblical with their desire to take center stage DAVKA through the Three Laws, as if to say the stage is open for who ever wishes to take the mic.
Is Russia the World Super Power through Three Laws of Noah?
- Honor Torah? yes
- No Gay Marriage? yes
- No Cannibalism [Islam] yes
Toward that end, the Kremlin has made one central demand, which does not at first glance seem terribly unreasonable. It wants Kiev to adopt a federal system of government giving far more power to the governors across Ukraine.
“A federal structure will ensure that Ukraine will not be anti-Russian,” said Sergei A. Markov, a Russian political strategist who supports the Kremlin.
Russian officials have said they envision a system in which the regions elect their own leaders and protect their own economic, cultural and religious traditions — including the forging of independent economic ties with Russia.
But many experts sharply dismiss the Russian plan as a stalking horse designed to undercut Ukrainian independence. “It is another way to dismantle and subjugate Ukraine,” said Lilia Shevtsova, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center. “It means Moscow could grab and peel off any part of Ukraine at any time.”
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia “wants Ukraine to be, one, absolutely neutral and, two, dependent on Moscow,” said Vladimir A. Ryzhkov, an opposition politician. “If you have a weak central government and strong governors, you can play directly with the governors over the head of Kiev.”
The United States, while supporting decentralization, has opposed giving too much power to the regions.
Many analysts said the question looming over Ukraine was not simply East versus West. The reality of Russian power is such that Ukrainians must perform a delicate balancing act, giving Mr. Putin enough influence to satisfy his demands while preserving their independence. This will center on the constitutional question of federalism, and will bear close watching, analysts said.
(Russia’s only other oft-stated demand, a simpler one, is preserving Russian as an official language — as it is now in regions where it is widely spoken.)
Russian officials are clear about their goals. “A centralized state will only be good for radicals,” said Sergei A. Zheleznyak, a deputy speaker of the Russian Parliament targeted for sanctions by the United States in March after pushing for the annexation of Crimea, using the shorthand favored by Russian officials to write off much of the Kiev government.
If Mr. Putin believes he is not getting his way on the Constitution, he can be expected to take action before the Ukrainian presidential election scheduled for May 25, when a new government and a new constitution will be cemented, according to a broad range of analysts.
Some analysts are pointing to events surrounding the May 9 anniversary of the defeat of Germany in World War II, when huge emotional crowds fill the streets, as a possible catalyst for Russia to push the solution it wants.
While exactly what the Kremlin will choose to do in the weeks ahead is impossible to predict, analysts cited three potential outcomes.
In the first, Russia either manages to sway the presidential election with a candidate it favors, or it succeeds in putting in place the federal constitution it seeks in order to hold veto power over foreign economic and military policy.
So far, no candidate is allied with Moscow outright. But the two main possibilities are Mikhail Dobkin, the candidate of the Party of Regions, the party long a Moscow favorite, and Yulia V. Tymoshenko, who forged a close working relationship with Mr. Putin when she was prime minister from 2007 to 2010. Ultimately, no Ukrainian leader is likely to risk openly hostile relations with Mr. Putin, given that roughly one-third of the country’s exports go to Russia.
The Kremlin wants to see a proposed constitution that cedes a great deal more power to the governors than the current one does. Analysts suggested that the best compromise would be something along the lines of what many call the “federalization and the Finlandization” of Ukraine. After World War II, Finland adopted a practical approach to its giant yet skittish neighbor — not joining NATO to this day, and avoiding European Union membership until well after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.
The second outcome is a kind of Crimea Annexation Part II, with residents of the east and south voting in a referendum on whether to join Russia. The protesters in Donetsk over the weekend already announced that they would hold such a referendum on May 11, though Moscow did not immediately endorse the proposal.
What worries Ukrainian officials, though, is that the Kremlin could change course and demand a referendum if it deems any new constitution insufficient. That, in turn, could lead to a military incursion.
This second outcome would undoubtedly destabilize Ukraine and thwart a full Western embrace, but it holds significant risks for Moscow.
First, there is no guarantee that Russia could take over large swaths of eastern Ukraine without a fight, as it did in Crimea. In addition, an incursion would almost certainly prompt much more severe American and European sanctions, badly damaging an already stagnating Russian economy. The United States said on Monday that any Russian interference in Ukraine would be considered a “serious escalation” that could prompt more sanctions.
Trying to bite off a chunk of Ukraine itself could also prove unpopular among Russians, and western Ukraine could emerge as a solid, anti-Russian ally of the West not terribly far from Russia’s borders.
There is also strong reason to believe that in a fair vote, the referendum would result in defeat. There has been no significant popular groundswell for joining Russia, as there was in Crimea, which was part of Russia until 1954 and is home to a significant population of Russian military veterans.
Perhaps most important, the oligarchs in eastern Ukraine, several of whom now govern the region, remain mostly opposed to becoming part of Russia.
The third and least likely outcome is a full-scale military invasion.
Domestic support for Mr. Putin skyrocketed after the annexation of Crimea and the Sochi Olympics. But the financial cost of an invasion, along with the potential for Russians coming home in body bags, could quickly reverse his roughly 70 percent approval rating.
Nevertheless, analysts said, an invasion cannot be ruled out. If Mr. Putin is driven solely by the emotional desire to recreate the Russian empire, or if Russian speakers are killed in any significant numbers, he may feel he has no choice but to respond with force.
The Kremlin’s propaganda machine has certainly been laying the groundwork for this possibility, with its constant stream of reports that Nazism is rising from the dustbins of history in Ukraine and is prepared to join forces with NATO. “Putin believes that if he allows this ultranationalist junta to consolidate power, it will be war eventually anyway, but with a much stronger U.S.-controlled army,” Mr. Markov said. “Better to resolve the problem when the situation is soft.”
Russia deploys a well-worn playbook to destabilize former Soviet republics that lean too far westward or risk becoming too independent. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova have all been subjected to Moscow’s strategy of taking chunks of territory, staying involved in their affairs and rendering them unpalatable to the West.
Ukraine is even more problematic because of its strategic position between Russia and Europe and its fundamental historic, cultural and religious ties to the Russian empire. Mr. Putin had envisioned Ukraine as the cornerstone of a budding Eurasian customs unit that would recreate the Russian empire in breadth and strength, acting as an anti-Western alternative to the European Union.
Still, most doubt the Ukraine crisis will come to a military solution.
Sergei Karaganov, dean of the School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs here and an occasional Kremlin consultant on foreign policy, noted that Russia had all manner of significant economic and other leverage, starting with gas supplies, that it could use before resorting to force. Mr. Karaganov is often credited with initiating the doctrine that Moscow should champion the interests of millions of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers left outside the borders when the Soviet Union collapsed.
“There are people who want to reunite with Ukraine,” he said, “but I don’t think that is the majority, even in the Kremlin.”